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NAFTA was merely the first draft of an economic constitution for North America. It was a deliberately lean document, intended only to dismantle barriers to trade and investment. Its architects planned neither for its success nor for the crises that would confront it. Although NAFTA fueled the train of continental integration, it did not provide conductors to guide it. As a result, two setbacks-the Mexican peso crisis of 1995 and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001-have threatened to derail the integration experiment.
The peso crisis was a blow to the Mexican economy and to U.S. and Canadian faith in integration. NAFTA'S authors had assumed that elim inating restrictions on the movement of capital and goods would, by dint of the market's magic, lead to unalloyed prosperity. No clause in the agreement established a mechanism to anticipate or respond to market failures. Whereas the EU had created too many intrusive institutions, North America made the opposite mistake: it created almost none.
The second shock to the North American body politic occurred The European experience with integration has much to teach North American policymakers, provided one understands the clear differences between the European and North American models.
European unity grew out of two cataclysmic wars, and its principal members are comparable in terms of both population and power. The per capita GDP of the EU'S wealthiest nation (Germany) is roughly twice that of its poorest (Greece), while the per capita GDP ofthe United States is nearly six times that of Mexico. North America's model has a single dominant state and has always been more market-driven, more resistant to bureaucracy, and more deferential to national autonomy than Europe's; these elements will always distinguish the two. But despite these differences, So years of European integration should teach by the "smart" border agreements already in the works before September ui-is to concentrate inspections on high-risk traffic while using better technology to expedite the transit of low-risk goods and people. This approach, however, is too narrow to solve so frundamental a problem. Now, the establishment ofthe U.S. Department of Homeland Security has unintentionally threatened integration as well.
Overcoming the tension between security and trade requires a bolder approach to continental integration: a North American customs union with a common external tariff (CET), which would significantly reduce border inspections and eliminate cumbersome rules-of-origin provisions designed to deny non-NAFTA products the same easy access. All three governments must also rethink the continental perimeter. Along with the CET, they should establish a "North American In addition, the United States and Canada should begin to merge immigration and refugee policies. It will be impossible to include Mexico in this process until the development gap is narrowed. In the meantime, the three governments should work to develop a North American passport, available to a larger group of citizens with each successive year. 
